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The Role of Feelings in Kant’s Account of Moral Educationi 
 
 
In line with familiar portrayals of Kant’s ethics, interpreters of his philosophy of 
education focus essentially on its intellectual dimension: the notions of moral 
catechism, ethical gymnastics and ethical ascetics, to name but a few.ii By doing so, 
they usually emphasise Kant’s negative stance towards the role of feelings in moral 
education, as they do in his moral philosophy in general.iii Kant’s emotionless ideal 
for humanity applies to children just as fully-fledged moral agents, and the task of 
education vis-à-vis feelings is one of restraint. Children need to learn self-control, 
discipline and most of all, the discipline of their sensible nature, which includes their 
feelings, inclinations, and desires. For, ‘The child should not be full of feeling but 
rather full of the idea of duty’ (LP 9:490). Kant is clear: the thought of duty is always 
better than the reliance on feelings. And yet there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: 
‘The inclinations to be honored and loved are to be preserved as far as possible.’ (LP 
9:482) Whilst the feeling of love of honor ‘should not occur in the first stage of 
education’ (LP 9:465) since a certain level of intellectual development is necessary, 
from the second stage, discipline, it should be cultivated and relied upon for the 
child’s moral development.iv This statement is not only at odds with Kant’s general 
claim that education should not encourage feelings, but more importantly, it 
encourages a feeling, the love of honor, that is on the face of it paradigmatically un-
Kantian. How are we to understand the fact that of all feelings, it is the love of honor 
that should be preserved?  
To answer this question, I will begin by clarifying the reasons behind Kant’s 
negative stance towards feelings in moral education. I will then turn to his account of 
the feeling of love of honor. After distinguishing between its good and its bad forms, I 
will consider two ways of making sense of the positive role Kant assigns to it. The 
first, modest reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honor is morally useful 
because it has two functions: an epistemic one, and a motivational one. The second, 
more ambitious reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honor enables the child 
to experience her inner worth as bearer of value. I will conclude on the respective 
strengths of each reading and draw their implications for our understanding of moral 
education.  
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1. Kant’s negative stance towards feelings in moral education 
While it may surprise readers of Kant who are only familiar with his Groundwork, he 
believes that the cultivation of feelings is not only an important part of the moral 
development of adults, it is even the object of a duty, albeit an indirect one.v In 
particular, they have the indirect duty to get acquainted with natural beauty so as to 
develop their capacity for disinterested love, and to get acquainted with those in need 
so as to further their capacity for sympathy.vi These feelings are meant to be helpful to 
moral agency by enabling them to become more morally efficacious – for instance by 
making them better able to detect situations where their duty of benevolence applies, 
or by facilitating the control of their self-interested tendencies. Whereas adults should 
cultivate their capacity for love and sympathy, children should not: ‘The child should 
not be full of feeling but rather full of the idea of duty’ (LP 9:490). Kant forbids 
children’s reliance on their feelings for two reasons.  
First, cultivating children’s feelings could expose them to the risk of being unable 
to control them. Thus, it is crucial that they learn discipline first, for it is the means to 
teach them self-control, and in particular control of their sensible nature; for instance 
by learning to sit still and doing what they are told.vii As Kant sums up, ‘Education 
should only prevent children from becoming soft’ (LP 9:463). To avoid children 
indulging their inclinations, we need to teach them to control themselves, and in 
particular their feelings, through discipline: ‘Discipline amounts to corrective 
training’ (V-Mo/Collins 27:466).  This is what Kant calls ethical gymnastics, which 
‘consists only in combating natural impulses sufficiently to be able to master them 
when a situation comes up in which they threaten morality’ (MM 6:485). Thereby, 
children become better able to act for the sake of duty rather than their inclinations, 
desires and self-interest.viii  
Second, cultivating children’s feelings, even if this cultivation is limited to so-
called ‘positive’ feelings such as sympathy and disinterested love, may threaten their 
understanding of what acting for the sake of duty consists in. For, they may be lead to 
believe that those feelings are a suitable source of moral motivation. After all, why 
not help others because we feel sympathy towards them? The risk of 
misunderstanding the nature of duty is too great, and thus ‘One must not so much 
soften the hearts of children in order for them to be affected by the fate of others, but 
rather make them upright’ (LP 9:490).ix Education should not encourage children’s 
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reliance on feelings in moral matters, even as a mere means to moral efficacy. They 
must have ‘the inner value of actions and deeds replace words and emotions, 
understanding replace feeling’ (LP 9:493). Of course, appealing to inclinations may 
be necessary in the first stage of education since moral discipline is only appropriate 
to the later stages of a child’s development. But Kant is clear: ‘Even if the child is 
unable to understand the duty, it is nevertheless better this way.’ (LP 9:482)  
Yet whilst ‘[t]he formation of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure…must be 
negative and the feeling itself must not be coddled’ (LP 9:477), there seem to be 
noteworthy exceptions. Namely, ‘The inclinations to be honored and loved are to be 
preserved as far as possible’ – in fact, not only should they be preserved, they are 
‘aids to morality’ (LP 9:482).x This statement is at odds with Kant’s general claim 
that moral education should not encourage feelings. But more importantly, as I will 
show in the next section, it encourages a feeling that seems on the face of it 
paradigmatically un-Kantian.   
 
 
2. The paradoxical nature of the love of honor 
To make sense of Kant’s claim, we should begin by examining how he accounts for 
the feeling of honor from a naturalistic perspective. For, the feeling of love of honor 
that is encouraged in children is not, or at least not originally, a moral feeling but 
rather a natural one.  
As part of a human being’s natural predispositions, the feeling of love of 
honor belongs to the predisposition to humanity ‘as a living and at the same time 
rational being’ (R 6:26). According to Kant, it is ‘a drive constantly to perfect oneself 
in comparison with others’ (V-Mo/Vigilantius 27:680), and like all natural drives, it 
has been implanted by nature to preserve the human species: ‘This inclination 
prompts the activity of making oneself equal to the other in every respect; nature has 
implanted this emulation in us’ (V-Mo/Vigilantius 27:695).xi The feeling of love of 
honor is an inclination to equality that is part of the natural mechanism that aims at the 
progress of the species.xii By making human beings desire honor through their love of 
it, nature motivates them to do whatever is necessary to ensure that they are equal to 
others in all respects – whether it is in terms of possessions, status, power, strength, 
and so on.  
Out of this self-love originates the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of 
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others, originally, of course, merely equal worth … but from this arises 
gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others. (R 75 
6:27) 
Through the competition they create for each other, human beings are forced to work 
and cultivate themselves, thereby realizing nature’s purpose for them, the 
development of their natural predispositions.  
However, whilst the feeling of love of honor begins as a desire to be valued by 
others, social interaction turns it into the desire to be valued over and above them in 
an on-going and never-ending quest for recognition:  
if he finds himself lowered by comparison with the other, that arouses in him 
dislike of the other’s person, and instead of actively exerting himself to 
become equal in value with the other, he succumbs to resentment at the latter’s 
worth and merit, or tries to diminish him. (V-MS/Vigil 27:695) 
Mechanically, through the interplay of social forces, the feeling of love of honor turns 
into a competitive drive that gives rise to what Kant calls the ‘vices of culture’ (R 
6:27).xiii For, human beings soon realise that fulfilling their desire for honor does not 
necessarily require real worth: ‘it is striving after the reputation of honor, where 
semblance suffices’ (A 7:272). The mere appearance of worth can achieve the same 
result but at a lesser cost. Think, for instance, of the infamous shopkeeper who gives 
the correct change in order to retain his customers. The mere appearance of virtue 
suffices to guarantee the reputation he needs to have a successful business.xiv Whether 
he is actually worthy of honor is indifferent to him as long as he appears to be so, and 
even if he knows it is undeserved. Appearance and reputation thereby take the place 
of true worthiness.  
There is thus the original feeling of love of honor, which is beneficial for the 
species and morally neutral, and the bad feeling of love of honor, what Kant calls 
‘love of honor in a bad sense’ (V-Mo/Vigilantius 27:695), which is a degenerate form 
of the former, and which is selfish and dangerous.xv They are both natural feelings, 
but when Kant talks of love of honor as an aid to morality, he has the former in mind 
rather than the latter. For, the feeling in its initial form, as it is found in young 
children for instance, has not had a chance to evolve. It is as nature intended it, as a 
drive to activity that is beneficial to the development of the species, and crucially for 
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our understanding of its role in moral education, there is no reason to think of it as 
necessarily selfish.  
Man has an impulse towards honor, which is quite unselfish; the craving for 
honor is often selfish, to wit, when it seeks honor to better its condition, to 
procure an office or a wife thereby; but he who seeks honor, without any 
ulterior motive, merely in the approval of others, is truly a lover of honor. (V-
Mo/Collins 27:410) 
Caring for and seeking the approval of others for its own sake, what Kant calls the 
“true” love of honor, is a laudable natural drive that is naturally unselfish.  
And yet encouraging the love of honor, even in its best form, seems 
paradigmatically un-Kantian. For, whilst famously for Kant, the worth of the person 
consists in her capacity for autonomy, the love of honor defines it heteronomously in 
terms of others’ opinion of it. There is thus a sense in which even the good form of 
love of honor retains the wrong direction of fit: the worth of the person is defined by 
whatever others take to constitute ‘honor’. The lover of honor allows her self to be 
defined, at least partly, by something that is beyond her control, and thereby, she 
compromises her autonomy:  
A human being's consciousness of his own nobility then disappears and he is 
for sale and can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer him. 
(MM 6:483)  
The feeling of love of honor is thus dangerous. Dangerous because it can easily 
degenerate into a mania or a craving to be valued over others, and thereby turn the 
self into its worst possible version. But most dangerous because it is a self-centred 
inclination that consists in the desire to be valued by others. In other words, in spite of 
the distinction between good and bad love of honor, it remains unclear why it is the 
only feeling, or at least one of the very few feelings, that moral education should 
preserve, cultivate and rely on.  
In what follows, I will consider two ways of making sense of the positive moral 
role assigned to the feeling of love of honor. The first reading, the modest one, will 
suggest that it is morally useful because it has two functions: an epistemic one, which 
enables the child’s openness to others and their judgment, and a motivational one, 
which encourages her to become worthy of honor. The second, more ambitious 
reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honor enables the child to experience 
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her inner worth.  
 
 
3. Making sense of the educational role of the love of honor 
3.1. A natural feeling with a moral function 
On Kant’s account, the task of the educator consists in using the child’s natural 
tendencies to cultivate her powers and reach her vocation: ‘Many germs lie within 
humanity, and now it is our business to develop the natural dispositions proportionally 
and to unfold humanity from its germs and to make it happen that the human being 
reaches his vocation.’ (LP 9:445) On the modest reading I would like to propose, the 
feeling of love of honor should be understood as one of the most efficient means the 
educator can use to facilitate her moral development. For, as I will show, it has two 
functions: an epistemic and a motivational one. I will examine them in turn. 
The first function of the feeling of love of honor is that it gives rise to a concern 
for the judgment of others. As early as the Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime, it is a feeling that is depicted as providing hidden 
incentives to adopt a standpoint outside oneself in order to judge the propriety and 
demeanor that one presents to the world: ‘We have, therefore, an honour-loving urge 
to refer our knowledge to the judgment of others.’ (V-Mo/Collins 27:411)xvi In an 
educational context, it makes the child care about others’ judgment in such a way that 
she cannot help but take it into consideration. It takes her out of herself and broadens 
her way of thinking, thereby fulfilling an epistemic function akin to the second 
principle of the sensus communis, ‘Thinking in the place of another’ (V-Anth/Busolt 
25:1480), which allows ‘broad-minded’ thinking (CJ 5:293f.).  
Providence has instilled the inclination to honor in us, and hence no man, 
even a great one, is indifferent to the opinion of others.…The intent of 
providence, in implanting this desire for respect from others, is that we should 
assess our actions by the judgment of others, so that such acts may not proceed 
solely from motives of self-love (V-Mo/Collins 27:408) 
Of course, the feeling of love of honor does not ensure that the child does not act from 
self-love. But minimally, it makes her care about others’ points of view insofar as she 
desires their recognition. If she does so for selfish reasons, it is at worst a self-centred 
openness to others’ opinion of her. But at its best, it is a legitimate care for others’ 
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judgment. And whichever form it takes, it forces her to think beyond herself, and 
thereby, it enables her to escape the subjective, private condition of judgment.xvii In 
this sense, the epistemic contribution of the feeling of love of honor is not so much 
that it helps the child notice oversights or errors, as it does in adults. Rather, it makes 
her aware of the fact that her opinion does not always dictate the nature of honor: 
whatever it consists in, it is not up merely to her. Whilst it is still a long way away 
from adopting an impartial standpoint, it is the first step towards it, a step out of her 
own perspective.xviii  
The second function of the love of honor is that it gives rise to a care for the 
child’s own worth. According to Kant, the most effective means to motivate a child to 
become morally worthy is not to harm her physically, but to harm her love of honor 
instead. Not only does it fulfill the retributive aspect of punishment, more importantly 
it motivates her to become worthy of honor:  
With regard to the love of honor, the instruction is negative; he must only 
learn to be sensible of the worth of his person. Through [his] merits, however, 
he must seek to become worthy of honor. (V-Anth/Fried 25: 728) 
The child’s love of honor prompts and strengthens her sense of her self as having 
worth through the development of her self-esteem.xix By giving her a sense of her 
potential for worthiness, it yields a desire to become actually worthy of it. Of course, 
when the feeling of love of honor functions as a motive in this context, as such it is 
not a moral motive. But if the educator directs its natural function towards moral 
worth, it will make her aspire to be truly deserving of honor when she becomes able 
to appreciate its worth.  
In this sense, to sum up the first modest reading, both the epistemic and the 
motivational functions of the feeling of love of honor are natural aids to the child’s 
moral development. They prepare her for morality by enhancing the capacities that 
are particularly conducive to it, namely her openness to the judgment of others and 
her sense of inner worth. But crucially, they are merely helpful means – they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure the child’s moral awareness.  
 
 
3.2. A moral feeling that opens the child to the realm of value 
On the second, more ambitious reading I would like to propose, Kant maintains that 
the feeling of love of honor should ‘be preserved’ (LP 9:490) because something sets 
 8 
it apart from all other feelings. Namely, it opens the child to the realm of value by 
enabling her to experience her dignity as bearer of value.  
There are a number of means an educator can use to enable a child’s awareness of 
her dignity. Kant mentions a few, for instance: 
The dignity of the human being could also be made perceptible already to the 
child with regard to itself; for example, in cases of uncleanliness, which after 
all is unbecoming for humanity (LP 9:489). 
Cleanliness, propriety, politeness can all be used to convey a concrete sense of the 
child’s worth.xx But my suggestion is that by contrast with these, the feeling of love of 
honor conveys it directly, as the awareness of herself as bearer of value. How are we 
to make sense of this function in light of the fact that the feeling of love of honor is 
such a dangerous feeling? As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, whilst it can 
easily degenerate into a mania for honor, especially in children who are literal works 
in progress, as Kant suggests in the following passage, even in its worst form, it 
retains its potential for morality.  
Nothing except honor can deter the individual from meanness. If an 
individual thus has no conscience, then a spark of honor can still be in him, 
which can check him. But if he is without honor, then all is lost with him, then 
there is nothing more on which one can base the good. (V-Anth/Fried 25:652; 
my emphasis) 
Unlike other feelings, the worst forms of the feeling of love of honor retain their 
potential for morality because in their very structure, they define the self as a bearer 
of objective value.xxi For, what all the forms of the love of honor have in common is 
that they involve regarding one’s self as having a worth that is not defined merely by 
the agent herself but rather by something other than herself (or at least other than her 
subjective, private standpoint)  – whether it is other agents, what society values, what 
god values or, of course, the moral law. The love of honor may consist in valuing 
others’ opinions of ourselves for the wrong reason (e.g., to be loved by them), or for 
the right reason (e.g., to improve our own judgment of ourselves). It may consist in 
valuing the wrong kind of attributes (i.e., non moral ones such as beauty, money, 
power and so on) or the right kind of attributes (i.e., moral ones such as kindness, 
generosity, doing one’s duty and so on). In other words, there are good and bad values, 
there are good and bad selves, and there is good and bad love of honor. But the crucial 
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point is that whichever form it takes, at its core, the feeling of love of honor consists 
in acknowledging the self’s potential as bearer of value which, whatever it consists in,  
is not merely up to her. In this sense, and somehow paradoxically, what we originally 
viewed as potentially un-Kantian, namely the fact that the love of honor defines the 
self’s worth heteronomously in terms of others’ opinion of it, turns out to be what 
makes it most conducive to morality. For, it assigns it a value that is grounded 
independently of the self’s private sphere.  
This is why the feeling of love of honor should be used in education despite the 
fact that the worth it is attached to is not grounded on the self’s dignity as an 
autonomous being – at least not to begin with. As it operates in young children who 
are in many ways pre-moral if not amoral beings, it originally takes a heteronomous 
form that is motivated by self-interest. But the role of moral education is precisely to 
connect the feeling of honor to the child’s conception of her own value, her dignity, 
and to do so in the right way: the right feeling for the right value. For, as I noted 
earlier, this feeling, which can easily degenerate into a mania for honor, is particularly 
dangerous in an educational context where it can come apart from the moral law, 
which is why Kant is more cautious than he is with adults. However, if the connection 
is done correctly, there is no reason why the feeling of love of honor cannot be used 
to enable the child’s openness to her own value. Of course, it is just one part of the 
process of moral education; and with it we are still a long way away from a fully-
fledged recognition of her dignity. But Kant’s point is, I believe, that with it, she is 
closer to it than it seems – or at least not as far as she would be otherwise.  
Yet one could object that just as the feeling of love of honor, shame, guilt and 
remorse also share an intrinsic connection to value. There is nothing special about 
honor, and thus there is no reason for Kant to treat it differently from other feelings. 
Yet on my reading, there is an important difference between the affective awareness 
of value enabled by the love of honor and what we usually call ‘moral emotions’. 
Moral emotions are affective reactions to our choices.xxii We feel guilty because we 
hurt someone; we feel proud because we helped someone in need. These feelings are 
the emotional effects of our moral choices, and our moral character more generally. 
By contrast, the feeling of love of honor is distinct from the particular feelings we 
happen to have as effects of our moral attitudes. It is the affective experience of our 
special status as bearers of value. Of course, in accordance with Kant’s transcendental 
framework, it does not amount to cognising ourselves as persons. Nevertheless, it 
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enables the awareness of our worth as persons insofar it enables us to appreciate the 
fact that we are morally worthy ‘as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally 
practical reason, exalted above any price’ (MM 6:434).xxiii  
Thus the role of the feeling of love of honor is not to guide the child by telling 
her what is morally valuable. Just as inclinations, feelings, including the feeling of 
love of honor, ‘can lead only contingently to what is good and can very often also 
lead to what is evil’ (G 4:411). It neither grounds nor spells out the child’s dignity; the 
moral law and practical reason do that.xxiv What it does, however, is enables her to 
become aware of her unconditional worth. For, as I have suggested, the feeling of 
love of honor is a crucial part of the educational process that teaches the child to value 
herself – her moral self rather than her sensible self, her intelligible character rather 
than her sensible character. It enables her to have a unique experience of herself, one 
that differs in crucial ways from her experience of other objects, including herself as a 
sensible being. Thereby, she becomes affectively attuned to her distinctive worth.xxv  
 
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, I would like to sum up the respective strengths of the readings I have 
presented and their implications for our understanding of moral education. The first 
reading, the modest one, suggests that the feeling of love of honor is morally useful 
because it has two functions: an epistemic one, which enables the child’s openness to 
others and their judgment, and a motivational one, which encourages her to become 
worthy of honor. The second, more ambitious reading suggests that the feeling of love 
of honor enables the child to experience her inner worth. Where these readings differ 
is that the modest reading emphasises its function as a moral aid, whilst the ambitious 
reading defines it as the child’s experience of her unconditional value. The former is a 
natural feeling that has a moral function; it is not intrinsically moral. It is a natural 
means to a moral end. The latter, by contrast, is properly called a ‘moral’ feeling. It is 
the affective awareness of one’s worth. What these readings have in common 
however is that in both cases, the feeling of love of honor has to do with the 
experience of value. They share the idea that what is important in education, by 
contrast with the cultivation of morality in adulthood perhaps, is its experiential 
dimension. For, just as the feeling of honor enables the experience of her dignity, 
much of Kant’s account of moral education has to do with the child’s experience of 
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her powers, whether it is her freedom or her consciousness of the moral law or her 
moral character.xxvi She needs to experience her powers as much as possible, and so in 
spite of the fact that paradoxically perhaps, what she needs to experience the most lies 
beyond the bounds of her experience. This is what makes education the most 
challenging task for humanity. 
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(Lectures on Anthropology), V-Mo (Lectures on Ethics), LP (Lectures on Pedagogy), G (Groundwork), 
CPrR (Critique of Practical Reason), CJ (Critique of the Power of Judgment), MM (Metaphysics of 
Morals), Obs (Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime), R (Religion within the 
Boundaries of Pure Reason). The reference is to the Akademie edition of Kant’s works, using the 
translations from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s Works (Cambridge University Press). I would like 
to thank Pablo Muchnik for inviting me to think about this issue for the NAKS meeting of the Eastern 
APA in 2014 as well as two referees of this journal for their help in revising this paper. 
ii See for instance Munzel (2003), Scott Johnston (2006), Surprenant (2010) and Roth (2010). Note that 
the aim of this paper is not to question the intellectual dimension of Kant’s account of moral education, 
a dimension that has been extremely well documented in these works. It is rather to question what is 
presumed to be Kant’s negative stance on the role of feelings in moral education. One notable 
exception is Moran (2009), esp. pp. 474 and 483.  
iii From the Groundwork to the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, his works 
seem to warrant this view (e.g., G 4:428, CPrR 5:118, MM 6:408). However, as recent work in Kant 
scholarship has suggested, Kant’s view of the role of feelings is a lot subtler than it is usually thought. 
See for instance Papish (2007) and Geiger (2011). 
iv According to Kant, education has three stages: care, discipline and formation (LP 9:441).  
v ‘Sympathetic joy and sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings of pleasure or pain (which are 
therefore to be called ‘aesthetic’ [ästhetisch]) at another's state of joy or sorrow (shared feeling, 
sympathetic feeling.) Nature has already implanted in man susceptibility to these feelings. But to use 
this as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence is still a particular, though only a 
conditional, duty. It is called the duty of humanity (humanitas)’ (MM 6:456). For a discussion of these 
indirect duties, see Cohen (2009): chapter 4 and Timmermann (2006).  
vi CJ 5:267 and MM 6:456–7 respectively.  
vii LP 9:442.  
viii The child’s ability to determine himself independently of sensuous impulses is what Kant calls the 
culture of discipline in the Critique of Judgment: it ‘is negative and consists in the liberation of the will 
from the despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain natural things and renders us unable 
to do our own selecting…in fact we are free enough to tighten or to slacken, to lengthen or to shorten 
[desires], as the purposes of reason require’ (CJ 5:432). 
ix See CPrR 5:151. As Sullivan notes, ‘it is a mistake to try to base morality on any feelings, even on 
what may seem to be moral emotions such as feelings of nobility. All such tactics…turn morality into 
prudence’ (Sullivan 1989:289).  
x See also ‘One must excite the inclinations that most closely agree with morality’, and in particular the 
love of honor (Refl 6619 19:113). The other two inclinations that most closely agree with morality are, 
unsurprisingly, sociability and freedom.  
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xi  See also V-Mo/Collins 27:408, V-Mo/Herder 27:63 and R 6:26-7. Kant’s account of ‘Nature’s 
intentions’ for the human species has been the object of numerous debates with which I cannot engage 
here due to restrictions of space. As is well known, Kant often portrays nature as having providential 
aspects, and in particular as designed to help human beings fulfil their moral destiny. For my present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that his conception of human nature characterizes it as consisting of 
natural predispositions that aim at the preservation of the species: ‘one can assume as a principle that 
nature wants every creature to reach its destiny through the appropriate development of all 
predispositions of its nature, so that at least the species, if not every individual, fulfills nature’s 
purpose’ (A 7:329). 
xii In this sense, the feeling of love of honor (Ehregefül) is the basis of a desire to be honored, and as we 
will see, this desire can take more or less pathological forms depending on the agent’s motivational set 
and her social circumstances (inclination, desire, drive, mania, urge, etc). Whilst Kant distinguishes 
between the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire, I do not think that it is particularly problematic 
in the context of this discussion since feelings for Kant are typically motivational. For a discussion of 
the transformation of the feeling of love of honor into mania and urge for honor, see Cohen (2014). 
xiii Recall Kant’s remark about the human capacity ‘to explore the thoughts of others but to withhold 
one’s own; a neat quality which then does not fail to progress gradually from dissimulation to 
intentional deception, and finally to lying’ (A 7:332). The capacity to conceal one’s thoughts plays a 
crucial role in the deterioration of the feeling of love of honor, as Rousseau noted in his second 
Discourse: ‘It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not’ (Rousseau (1973): 
86). For Rousseau’s criticism of politeness as a source of evil and a social veil on vice, see Rousseau 
(1973): 6. 
xiv See G 53 4:398.  
xv Note that the good and bad forms of the feeling of love of honor, which are both natural feelings, 
should be distinguished from the love of honor as a moral feeling, which is akin to the feeling of self-
esteem. There are thus three different kinds of feeling of love of honor:  a natural one, which is morally 
neutral, a social one, which is a degenerate and immoral form of it, and a moral one, which is ‘the 
feeling of inner worth (valor), in terms of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an 
inalienable dignity (dignitas interna), which instills in him respect for himself’ (MS 558 6:436). This 
paper is focused on the first two feelings.  
xvi See also Obs 2:226f. For a compelling account of the feeling of love of honor in the Observations, 
see Makkreel (2012). Note that there seems to be an interesting shift that occurs from the Observations 
to Kant’s later anthropological works. In the former, the feeling of the love of honor merely 
compensates for the lack of virtue in order to secure the survival of the human species in spite of the 
moral shortcomings of its parts (see Cohen (2012)). In the latter by contrast, it is portrayed as a means 
to its moral development.  
xvii  Through this principle, one ‘sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the 
judgment’ (CJ 5:295). In this sense, the question of whose judgment the love of honor is meant to 
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encourage children to seek is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that the child becomes aware 
that her opinion is not the be-all and end-all.  
xviii Note that what Kant encourages in children is the capacity to look at themselves from an outside 
perspective, which differs from the act of comparing themselves with others, which is something he 
disapproves of. For instance, ‘Envy is aroused when one points out to a child to value itself according 
to the value of others. Instead the child should value itself according to the concepts of its own reason.’ 
(LP 9:492) On my reading, the epistemic role of the love of honor is one way of enabling children to 
achieve the latter.  
xix See for instance V-Mo/Collins 27:357.  
xx This function is akin to the function they play in the moral development of the human species. See 
for instance Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History 8:113.  
xxi Other feelings such as guilt and anxiety are also centred on the self and its value. What distinguishes 
the love of honor from these feelings, however, is that it ties together the value of the self and the 
opinion of others, thereby forcing the self to go beyond its private standpoint and thus its subjective 
judgment of itself. I would like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for helping me refine my 
account on this point.  
xxii ‘an aesthetic of morals, while not indeed part of the metaphysics of morals, is still a subjective 
presentation of it in which the feelings that accompany the constraining power of the moral law (e.g., 
disgust, horror, etc., which make moral aversion sensible) make its efficacy felt, in order to get the 
better of merely sensible incitements’ (MM 6:406). See for instance Sullivan (1989): 135 
xxiii To formulate this claim slightly differently, although I cannot defend it here, we could say that the 
feeling of love of honor is the natural or sensible form of the feeling of respect for oneself as moral 
being. Thomason could be read as hinting at a similar claim (Thomason (2013): 238). 
xxiv For instance, ‘common human reason, with this compass in hand [the moral law], knows very well 
how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity 
with duty or contrary to duty’ (G 4:404). Practical reason and the moral law spell out the objective 
grounds of the duties of virtue: ‘For, every morally practical relation to human beings is a relation 
among them represented by pure reason’ (MM 6:451). Thus, ‘we no more have a special sense for what 
is (morally) good and evil than for truth’ (MM 6:400). As Sherman puts it, feelings ‘serve poorly both 
as norms and as motives’ (Sherman (1997): 128). 
xxv Note that this is only the beginning of Kant’s account of the moral role of love of honor. For, in his 
Lectures on Ethics, Kant claims that love of honor is the object of ‘a duty’ (V-Mo/Vigilantius 27:635), 
‘the highest duty of humanity toward oneself’ (V-Mo/Vigilantius 27:664). However, this paper is 
limited to the discussion of the natural feeling of the love of honor. For a discussion of it as a duty, see 
Denis (2014). As she writes, ‘we must sharply distinguish human beings’ various feelings, 
inclinations, impulses, predispositions, interests, and drives regarding worth, standing, or esteem from 
the virtue love of honor, even if Kant sometimes labels them ‘love of honor’’ (Denis (2014): 204). On 
my interpretation, the function of love of honor as a natural feeling is not to turn into a moral feeling. It 
is rather to play a moral role by enabling the child to become aware of her value.  
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xxvi It is in this spirit that Kant disapproves of the use of habit or swaddling: ‘All artificial devices of 
this kind [machines, corsets, weights] are so much the more detrimental in that they run contrary to the 
end of nature in an organized, rational being, according to which it must retain the freedom to learn to 
use its powers.’ (LP 9:463)  
